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"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times." So 
wrote Charles Dickens a century ago at the start of his 
classic novel A Tale of Two Cities. And so might think 
President George Bush now at the start of his new 
Administration in Washington. For the Unites States 
confronting the internatíonal economic scene today, it is 
indeed both the best and worst of times. 
It is the best of times because of the generally robust 
prosperity that is so evident in so many countries in the 
world economy today. In the United States itself, recovery 
from the recession of 1981-82 has now continued without 
interruption for more than six years. And growth is even 
higher in many of the other industrial nations of Western 
Europe and Japan, while inflation and unemployment are 
both down significantiy. In many parts of the Third World, 
growth has also been strong in recent years. This is 
especially true of the newly industrializing countries of East 
and Southeastern Asia. And even in the centrally planned 
economies of China and the Soviet bloc, economic prospects 
are looking better as a result of a variety of market-oriented 
reforms — perestroika. In all these respects, the international 
economic environment seems benign and unthreatening for 
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the new Administration. 
In other respects, however, the environment is 
anything but benign. Beneath the surface of the current 
prosperity lurk numerous and serious policy challenges for 
the Administration that can be ignored only at its — and our 
- peril. In relations with the other industrial countries, the 
Unites States faces potentially hazardous problems of 
persistent payments imbalances, exchange-rate uncertainties, 
and protectionist trade pressures. In relations with the 
Third World, there remains the vexing and seemingly 
intractable probiem of external debt. And in relations with 
the centrally planned economics, there remains the question 
of how best to respond to the new policies of reform and 
restructuring. For the United States today, the key issue is 
how to cope with all these challenges at a time when 
America's own relative position in the world economy 
appears to be in historie decline. How the Bush 
Administration reacts to all these challenges will go a long 
way to determining whether the current prosperity of the 
community of nations can be maintained or not. 
I 
In relations with the other industrial countries, the 
new Administration's most pressing challenge is to cope 
with the related problems of persistent payments imbalances 
and exchange-rate uncertainties. At the core is America's 
own external déficit, which during the eight years of the 
Reagan Administration soared as high as $150 billion a year, 
and which is still running in excess of $100 billion annually. 
Déficits of this magnitude can persist only so long as the 
rest of the world is prepared to help finance them by 
acquiring claims on the United States. Between 1980 and 
1988 America borrowed more than $700 billion from the rest 
of the world in this fashion, shifting in the process from 
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being the world's largest creditor nation to being its largest 
debtor. The key question is whether foreign creditors will 
be willing to continué financing America's déficits on this 
scale and what happens if they are not. 
The risks are clear. Any significant decline of foreign 
willingness to finance America's déficits could precipitate a 
major fall of the dollar, destabilizing exchange markets 
everywheré. The only way to prevent a dollar crisis would 
then be increase U.S. interest rates sharply, which could 
precipitate widespread recession. Neither prospect is 
especially to be desired. 
What, then, can the Bush Administration do to avoid 
the twin risks of exchange-market instability or global 
recession? First and foremost, everyone recognizes, it must 
act effectively to reduce the domestic counterpart of the 
country's externa! imbalance the déficit in the U.S. 
Government's own budget. Although the exact nature of 
the link between America's fiscal and payments imbalances 
is not entirely clear, the general connection between the two 
is undisputed: dependence on foreign financing is a direct 
result of the greatly enlarged budget déficits generated by 
the Reagan tax cuts of the early 1980s. President Bush says 
that reduction of the fiscal déficit will be a priority of his 
Adminstration. But doubts persist that much can actually 
be accomplished so long as the new President continúes to 
ask people to "Read my lips: No new taxes," while the 
Democratic-controUed Congress continúes to oppose further 
substantial cuts in spending programs. Clearly, prolongation 
of the budgetary stalemate would not help to sustain the 
confidence of foreign creditors. Effective action to restore 
payments equilibrium abroad must begin with an 
enlightened compromise on fiscal policy at home. 
In addition, the new Adminstration must also act to 
bolster the mechanisms of policy cooperation among the 
major industrial nations that have been set in place in 
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recent years. Coordinated exchange-market intervention 
must be continued to contain the risk of a serious dollar 
crisis, at the same time that appropriate adjustments of 
domestic policies are initiated not only in the United States 
but in the principal surplus countries as well, particulariy 
West Germany and Japan. Fiscal contraction in the United 
States must be matched by more expansionary policies 
elsewhere if the risk of a serious recession is to be avoided. 
Imaginative economic dimplomacy will be required of 
President Bush and his policy makers to overeóme 
understandable hesitations at home and abroad to making 
individual concessions for the common good. 
II 
The same is also true in the /ield of trade policy, 
where relations among the industrial nations in recent years 
have been especially tense and conflictual. Disputes have 
erupted on all sides, as protectionist trade pressures in the 
European Community and Japan as well as in the United 
States have generated increasing friction on issues ranging 
from agriculture and automobiles to steel and high 
technology. The risk, clearly, is that the spread of 
mercantilist impulses in individual nations could seriously 
erode the multilateral trading system, endangering the 
economic gains of all. And nowhere is this a more pressing 
challenge than in the United States, still the world's largest 
trading natíon. Here too imaginative economic diplomacy 
v^U be required to reconcile the often conflicting imperatives 
of nation¿ interest and systematic responsability. 
Under the Reagan Administration, America's response 
to this challenge was two-fold — on the one hand, 
occasionally erecting new barriers to imports at home; on 
the other hand, actively pursuing the réduction of oíd 
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barriers to U.S. exports abroad. The bias of policy was 
supposed to be in favor of more open markets, which 
officials sought to promote both bilaterally, through 
negotiations with individual trading partners, and 
multilaterally through the so-called Uruguay Round of 
GATT trade talks. In practice, however, the Reagan 
Administration proved to be one of the most protectionist 
American governments of the twentieth century, as new 
import restrictions were imposed on a wide range of 
products, from automobiles to specialty steels. 
Administration spokemen argued that these were adopted 
mainly for the purpose of containing domestic protectionist 
pressures and avoiding enactment of even more stringent 
Controls by the Congress. Their pro-trade bias, they said, 
was best illustrated by the successful conclusión of 
comprehensive free-trade agreements with both Israel and 
Canadá. But for most of America's trading partners, the 
effect of Ronald Reagan's eight years in office was a rising 
level of tensión and irritation. 
The challenge for the Bush Administration will be to 
find some way to reduce that tensión and irritation, 
restoring a genuinely pro-trade bias to policy, while 
continuing to contain domestic protectionist pressures that 
now seem stronger than ever. The stubbornness of the 
U.S. external déficit, despite a more than fifty percent 
depreciation of the dollar since 1985, is increasingly 
persuading many Americans that the game of International 
trade is simply not played on a "level playing field," and 
that the only answer to unfair trade practices abroad is a 
higher level of import barriers at home. Greater 
insularity on the part of the United Stated, however, is 
unlikely to be accepted passively by other governments, 
which would undoubtedly be placed under equally strong 
pressures to retalíate in kind. Trade war could be the final 
result, unless President Bush can find a way to satisfy the 
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demands of his own domestic constituents without unduly 
threatening the interests of foreign competitors. 
III 
In relations with the Third World the new 
Administration's biggest challenge is of course the debt 
problem, now seemingly no closer to solution than when it 
began with Mexico's financial crisis back in 1982. For more 
than six years, debtor governments have struggled mightliy 
to keep up interest payments to their creditors. The vain 
result, in most cases, has been persistent economic 
stagnation, as investment has dried up at home and much 
domestic capital has fled abroad. The risk of the situation, 
as recent events in Venezuela have dramatically 
demonstrated, is that frustrations borne of declining living 
standards could lead to popular resistance and political 
instability, perhaps even to revolutionary changes of 
government. The only solution, it is equally clear, is to ease 
the cash-flow strains on debtor countries in a context of 
renewed growth as well as continued stability in financial 
markets. Even before he formally took office in January, 
George Bush promised a "whole new look" at the debt 
problem to see if such a solution could be found. 
Under the Reagan Administration, the main emphasis 
of policy was on limited financial accomodations by 
creditors (mainly in the form of debt reschedulings plus, 
occasionally, some new lending) coupled with the 
acceptance of firm policy conditions by debtors, usually in 
the form of an IMF stabilization program. But while that 
approach was highly successful in buying time for 
commercial lenders to reduce their vulnerability to default, 
thus easing the threat of a serious banking crisis, it clearly 
failed to restore the lost solvency of sovereign debtors. 
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Nonetheless, U.S. authorities remained stubbornly resistant 
to all calis for an alternative strategy of debt relief for as 
long as they possibly could. 
A first break in U.S. policy carne at the Toronto 
economic summit last year when for the first time, under 
pressure from some of its major allies, the American 
Government formally agreed to consider some mild relief 
measures for the sub-Saharan región of África, where most 
debts are owed to official creditors. And this trend has now 
been reinforced by the recent proposals of the new 
Administration's Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady, calling 
on banks to offer voluntary relief measures, to be supported 
by official guarantees, for the middle-income group of 
debtors located mainly in Latin America. The frustrations 
of debtor countries have clearly had an impact on the 
thinking of policy makers in Washington. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether the Bush Administration's first 
initiative on this issue can indeed suffice to keep the 
problem from getting out of control. 
IV 
In relations with the centrally planned economies, the 
new Administration's main challenge reflects an oíd 
dilemma: What attitudes toward the marxist East best serve 
the political and economic interests of the capitalist West? 
Presently many of the governments of the East, led by 
China and the Soviet Union, are hurriedly seeking to enact 
market-oriented reforms to revive their stagnant and 
decaying economies, opening up attractive new opportunities 
for trade and investment by the West. The issue for the 
Western alliance, led by the United States, is how best to 
respond to this intriguing and complex situation. Are 
prospects for International peace enhanced- by policies of 
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active support for the current wave of liberalization in the 
East? Ór would we be better off leaving the Marxist 
economies to continué floundering in their own self-induced 
decay? Much rides on how the Bush Administration 
eventually attempts to answer these crucial questions. 
V 
Underlying all these challenges is the most 
fundamental issue of all for the United States: how to cope 
with its own historie decline in the global economy. Forty 
years ago, at the end of World War II, America clearly 
dominated every dimensión of International economic 
relations, and Washington was relatively unconstrained in 
the formulation and implementation of its commercial and 
financia] policies, But all that has changed as a 
result of a spectacuiar recovery of Western Europe and 
Japan and the emergence of other influential actors in an 
increasingly multipolar world economy. No longer can the 
United States exercise unquestioned authority on economic 
policy issues. Today other countries too occupy positions of 
power in the system. 
Can America learn to cope with its relative decline 
without destabilizing the overall system? The stakes are 
high. Under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. Government often 
seemed tempted to revert to its oíd accustomed unilateralism 
—putting narrow national concerns ahead of broader 
systematic responsabilities-- only to find American interests 
threatened by the unforeseen consequences of its own 
actions. This was as evident in the área of monetary 
relations, where "voodoo economies" at home led to 
unprecedented payments imbalances and exchange-rate 
fluctuations abroad, as it was in the trade área, where trade 
wars with the European Community or Japan were on 
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several occasions only very narrowly averted. Will the Bush 
Administratíon contínue to risk economic Gotterdamerung 
by perpetuating the illusion of U.S. dominance? Or will 
Washington now recognize the need for genuine 
compromise and cooperation with others in order to 
preserve global prosperity and growth? The well-being of 
US all rests in the balance. 
